Reciprocity and Giving in a Consecutive Three-Person Dictator Game with Social Interaction

Bahr, Gunter and Requate, Till (2014) Reciprocity and Giving in a Consecutive Three-Person Dictator Game with Social Interaction German Economic Review, 15 (3). pp. 374-392.

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Abstract

We study pure indirect reciprocity by setting up a modified dictator game with three players A, B, and C acting sequentially. Subject A takes a share of a pie and passes the rest to subject B, while B divides the rest between herself and C. We find that this consecutive three-person dictator game increases generosity compared with the traditional two-person dictator game. We analyze the influence of social interaction and uncertainty. In treatments with certainty we observe pure indirect reciprocity: B indirectly reciprocates for A's behavior in the decision on how generous to be to C.

Document Type: Article
Additional Information: Times Cited: 0 0
Research affiliation: OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence > FO-R03
OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence > FO-R02
Kiel University
OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence
Refereed: Yes
ISSN: 1465-6485
Projects: Future Ocean
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2015 11:57
Last Modified: 13 Apr 2017 12:51
URI: http://eprints.uni-kiel.de/id/eprint/27117

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